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3
1

TUESDAY-, SEPTEMBER 2-. 1550

2

3

LAU CLERK SCHMIDT:

City of Cleveland!

4

Plaintiff-, versus’ the Cleveland Electric

5

Illuminating Company-, Defendant-, Civil Action

6

No. C 7S-StaO.

7

THE COURT:

8

ladies and gentlemen.

9

MR. NORRIS:

10

Good morningn

Good morning-, your

Honor.

11

MR. LANSDALE:

Good morning.

12

THE COURT:

i assume ue are

13
14

. 15

prepared to proceed this morning.

Mr. Norris-, on behalf of the City?
MR. NORRIS:

Yes-, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

Mr. Lansdalef

17

MR. LANSDALE:

Yes-, your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

Before-, gentlemeni

19

we address the matters requiring our attention

20

pursuant to this Court's pretrial order-, perhaps

21

it would be in order for the Court to advise

22

counsel as to what it has in mind-, procedurewise-,

23

for the balance of the week.

24

The Court has-, as best it could-, honored

25

your requests for voir dire procedure and has

J

4

1

incorporated into the voir dire procedure the

2

requests of respective counsel in the proposed

3

interrogation of the jury panel-

4

I have summoned a jury panel of SOD

5

veniremen-

6

voir dire examination a week from today-

7

However! I have revised my thinking on that and

8

due to space limitations and the time factors

9

involved! the Court has summoned the veniremen!

10

to appear on Thursday morning —

11
12

Initially! we were to commence the

At what time! tlr- Schmidt! do you recall?

10:00 o'clock?

13

LAld CLERK SCHhlDT:

YeS! sir-

14

THE COURT:

— and the second

15

hundred toappear at 1:30-

16

The Court has attempted to classify its

17

approach to the voir dire by drafting a series

18

of written interrogatories which it will submit

19

to each segment of the jury panel summoned on

20

Thursday -

21

The jurors! after an appropriate statement

22

of fact! will be — will have to complete answers

23

to written interrogatories that are submitted to

24

them-

25

Hopefully by the end of the day on Thursday

S

1

2
3

4

we will have the responses of the 2D0 jurors.
The Court will make available to counsel the

responses of each of the members of the panel-

Counsel will be perm’itted to evaluate those

5

answersi and subsequent to thatn to the evaluation

6

with the cooperation of counseb hopefully we will

7

be able to eliminate from the panel those

8

individuals who obviously should not be permitted

9

to servei and we will discuss the eliminations for

10
11

cause at that time.

Hopefully we will by this procedure reduce

12

the number of veniremen that will be available to

13

select the jury of six individuals that will serve

14

in this casei and it is the intention of the Court

15

to select six alternate jurors to serve in the

16

event that oneor more of the selected jurors will

17

be unable to serve.

18
19
20

I don’t really know how long it should take

counsel to evaluate the 500 questionnaires.
Hr. Norris-i do you suppose you could be

21

prepared to discuss the matter with some degree of

22

reasonable approach to the problem by Friday

23

afternoon or Saturday morningl^

24
25

HR. NORRIS:
Saturday morning.

I would prefer

k

1

THE COURT:

Mr- Lansdale?

2

HR. LANSDALE:

So would wen if

3

your Honor please-

4

May .1 ask a question in that regard?

5

Will we be working Thursday on other things

6

or beginning.to get some of the questions on

7

Thursday?

8
9
10
11

THE COURT:

Thatn gentlemenn

depends upon how well you have conformed to the
Court’s pretrial order-

If counsel complied with my orders we should

12

have reduced these preliminary matters to a

13

minimum-

14

be here all week-

15
16

In the event that you have.notn we will

tlR- LANSDALE:

We will be here

Thursday-

17

THE COURT:

18

Gentleraenn thenn we will consider at least

Very well-

19

tentativelyn we will consider Saturday morningn a

20

Saturday morning sessionn at which time we will

21

discuss possible challenges for causen and

22

hopefully counsel will be cooperative enough to

23

get together in an attempt to agree on at least

24

the broad parameters of your challenges for cause

25

so that we can dispense with that segment of the

7
1

2
3

4

jury impaneling in the interest of both parties-

HR- IdEINER:

Your Honori I have

two questions that come to mind:

Onei does the Court anticipate counsel seeing

5

the written interrogatories that will be going to

6.

the panelf

7
8

9
10

THE COURT:

If you would wait a

minuten I will get to thatfIR. WEINER:-

Thank you-

And alson do you anticipate counsel being

11

present on Thursday when the questionnaires are

12

filled outf

13

THE COURT:

That is up to you-

14

You can be here-

15

is your prerogative to attend or not to attend-

This is a public trial-, and it

16

I would suggest that you be here-

17

Certainly we will probably be addressing

18

other matters while the jury is going through the

19

matter of the questionnaires that the Court

20

contemplates giving to the panel-

21

The Court is presently having prepared in

22

final draft the proposed questions that will be

23

24

submitted to the jury panel.
Basically-, gentlemen-, they are the standard

25

voir dire questions-, supplemented by what the

a
I

1

plaintiff has requested be incorporated and what

2

the defendant has requested be incorporated! so

3

there should be little if any controversy about

4

the form of the questionnaire.

5

6

.Needless to sayn the Court will entertain

any reasonable suggestions for modifications.

7

Certainly the Court has incorporated in its

8

opening statement of the facts to the jury panel

9

those areas which.the plaintiff and the defendant

10

have requested to be incorporated in the language

11

of the Court and basically the statement of the

12

facts.

13

I thinkn' gentlemen! absent any questions! that

14

I have nothing further as to the preliminary

15

preliminaries.

16

Very well.

The first order of business will

17

be the consideration of proposed stipulations of

18

fact.

19

riay I review those?

20

{Documents were handed to the Court by the

21

22

Clerk.1

THE COURT:

Needless to say!

23

gentlemen! the voir dire procedure which I have

24

outlined is merely preliminary to the complete

25

voir dire examination.

Ue will continue the

5.
1

voir dire with the remaining veniremen on an

2

oral basis either honday or Tuesday of next

3

ueek •

4
5

6

Counsel are auarei I assumei that each side

will be permitted three peremptory challenges-

As far as alternates are concerned — before

7

I get to alternatesn a passi gentlemeni is

8

considered as a challenge.

9

passes constitutes a waiver of any further

10

Two consecutive

outstanding peremptory challenges.

As it relates to your alternates! each side

11

12

will be permitted a single peremptory challenge

13

per alternate.

14

utilization of a challenge.

15

passes constitutes a waiver of further challenges.

Here againi a pass equates to

16

Hr. Lansdaief

17

HR. LANSDALE:

18

Two consecutive

I wish to make a

comment concerning the stipulations! sir.
You will be’handed a stipulation! draft

19

20

stipulation! prepared by the plaintiff pursuant

21

to discussions we have been having the past few

22

days.

23

and I have conveyed already to the plaintiff that

24

there are some! as far as I am concerned!

25

mistakes in it-

I received this final form late last night

10

1

I wouldn’t want your Honor to understand

2

that I suggest there is any deliberate mistake

3

because this is a very complicated thingn but

4

according to my notes, there are certain things

5

in this draft that your Honor has that I cannot

6

agree to or that I think we had an understanding

7

as to a somewhat different version.

8

9

THE COURT:

Uelln that’s what we

are here fori gen'tlemeni and that’s what we will be

10

addressing during the balance of this week.

11

will make every effort to resolve these areas of

12

controversy as best we can because once we

13

commence trialn it will be protracted and arduous

14

enough.

15

controversies! counsel will have a forum whereby

16

they can present their case in an adversary manner

17

to the jury without imposing unduly upon the time

18

of the jury.

19
20

HR.

Ide

Once we eliminate these procedural

LANSDALE:

Hay I add one more

thing! sirf

21

THE

COURT:

Yes.

22

HR.

LANSDALE:

Ide have approached

23

the stipulations with the spirit that we would

24

agree to things which we regarded then as

25

factual! whether.we regarded them as admissible

I

11
1

or relevant or noti andi therefore! we reserve

2

the right to object to the admissibility! and I

3

will have prepared written objections to the ones

4

we object to.

5

THE COURT:

I understand that

6

and! for the record! counsel should be assured

7

that as concerns the exhibits which have been

8

pre-marked and exchanged by counsels we are

9

concerned primarily at this juncture of the case

10

with the authenticity and the accuracy of those

11

exhibits.

12

Needless to say! if counsel can further agree

13

upon relevancy and materiality! so much the better.

14

However! absent such an agreement as to any

15

particular exhibit! counsel reserve-s the right to

16

object to relevancy and materiality.

17

appropriate time the Court will rule! depending

18

upon the evolution of the evidence at that

19

particular moment-

At the

20

HR. NORRIS:

Your Honor! —

21

THE COURT:

Yes! Hr. Norris?

22

HR. NORRIS:

Could I inquire

23

whether the^Court has ruled on the City's motion

24

with respect to drawing the panel from certain

25

portions of the Northern District? .

IS
fir. Norrisi the

THE COURT:

Court is presently considering the outstanding

motions that were filed very recently in this

matter andn needless to sayi I am sure that you
appreciate the fact thatn in addition to ruling
upon those motionsi the Court has been required
during this same period of time to attend to

its normal docket in addition to preparing
preliminary matters in anticipation of the trial
of this case.

in the mill.

I have those mattersi so to speaki

Just as soon as written memorandums

are completedn you will be advised.

That goes for all outstanding motions.
And needless to sayn gentlemenn since we
have commenced the casei the Court will not
entertain further written motions unless it

consents thereto.

I might say further that I have prepared a
rather extensive list of proposed stipulations

that really have been taken from the pleadings
of the parties which the Court considered to be

admissions of fact.

Hopefullyn those matters

had been incorporated into the joint stipulation
of fact which I have just received this mbmenti

and there is nothing like the present to start

13
reviewing the stipulationsn gentlemenriR. NORRIS:

Your Honor-, I had

one other question.

The pretrial order requires

clients to be present-

Hr- Idagner has other

pressing city matters-

Uould it be appropriate

if Hr- Wagner were to leave this pretrial
conference on the understanding that as soon as

we can find Mr-

Joseph Pandy-, who is going to be

the City's representative-, designated by the
Mayor to sit through the trial as the City's

representative -- we are going to obtain MrPandy's presence and I would ask the Court to

permit Mr- Wagner to depart if that is all right
with the Court.

THE COURT:

I have no problem

with that-, Mr- Norris.

And I might advise that the requirement of
the presence of a principal — perhaps I should
clarify this in my pretrial order — is mandatory

only during the preliminaries of any given caseThe purpose of that is to acquaint the parties as
to the manner in which their case is being

administered-, the attention that their legal
counsel have devoted to the case-, to a degree
the issues that are involved in any particular

14
cassn the preparation preliminary to trial that
is required in any given case andi of coursen the
last reason being in such cases where there have
been probabilities of resolution without the

necessity of trialn those matters could be

expedited with the presence of the principals.
So once the case is commenced! this Court
does not mandate that any principal be present.

HR. NORRIS:

Thank you.

THE COURT.:

Let me ask thisi

Mr. Lansdale.

Have you noted your objections to

the proposed stipulations?
HR. LANSDALE:

If you are looking

at the document that plaintiff presented —

THE COURT:

Yesn which is

styled "Joint Stipulations."
tlR. LANSDALE:

— I can give you

very quickly my objections! and I am not sure
they are not things that can’t be worked out

between us.

THE

COURT:

Let me ask this.

As it relates to the balance of those —
HR.

LANSDALE:

Ue are agreed.

THE

COURT:

You are agreed.

Very well.

15
1

HR. LANSDALE:

Yes-

J

2

THE COURT:

Then I think perhaps

3

the best approach would be if counsel would just

4

confer together at this time and decide whether or

5

not you can resolve the area of controversy as to

6

those proposed stipulations you have not agreed on.

7

MR. LANSDALE:

All right-

8

THE COURT:

In the meantime! I

9

will undertake to review these-

10

Uhen you have concluded! please advise me-

11

ilR. WEINER:

I have forgotten-

12

Does the Court have a procedure on moving around

13

the courtroom while things are going onf

14
15

THE COURT:

of the jury.

16

HR. WEINER:

17

IShort pause-!

18

THE COURT:

19
20
21

Only in the presence

Thank you-

Gentlemen! let me

ask you this:

In reviewing the stipulations we go through
l-SS! which appear to be definitions.

22

Is that the totality?

23

HR. LANSDALE:

It is the totality

24

of the definitions that we have agreed on.

25

is one to come in and one to go out-

There

lb

1

l-lD we have a disagreement oni and there is

2

an additional one that we have an agreement on

3

that was inadvertently omitted.

4

THE COURT:

Idhat is l.lDf

5

MR. LANSDALE:

It is an isolated

6
7

utility.

THE COURT:

It is a vertically

8

integrated utility ,that has no interconnection

9

with any other utility?

10

HR. LANSDALE:

Yes.

11

THE COURT:

Uhat is the area

12
13

of

conflict?

HR. LANSDALE:

There is a wide

14

dispute of the use of the proper terminology for

15

interconnectionn and moreover! we have documents

16

which will be admitted into evidence in which

17

people use these in different meanings.

18

To some people you are an isolated integrated

19

utility! and to others you are a synchronous

20

interconnection! and there are those differences!

21

and the documents themselves! I am sure on those

22

documents it will be apparent when you come to

23

summon the document that the authors have used

24

the terminology in different ways! and I did not

25

want to agree to. accept a definition to this case

17
that would carry over into an alteration of the
meaning of the documents.

THE COURT:

Let me ask this:

As a practical matter, to the evidentiary
presentation! can we stipulate both definitions!
and then I assume when your witness is going to

testify! any witness that is going to testify!

when that witness will allude to the use of the
term "vertically integrated utility!" that
counsel will make an entry as to the context

within which the term is being utilized?
flR. LANSDALE:

I have no objection.

THE COURT:

Let me give you the

basis for my thinking:

I think that on this! Nr. Lansdale! and I am

only trying to devise methods of keeping the jury
informed as a method of efficient presentation;
and if this constitutes the list of definitions

that are going to be alluded tO! my suggestion
is! counsel! that there be jointly prepared a
board or some sort of rather large board that
puts the terms on it! and if the jury is

desirous of referring to a definition! all they

have to do is look at the board.
MR. LANSDALE:

I have no objection

la

1

to 1.10 standing alonsn providing we don’t have

2

an unresolvable conflict in determining what an

3

interconnection is-

4

The document uses the term interconnection

5

in four or five different waysn and it has

6

different meaningsn and they are apparent when

7

you see the document.

8

THE COURT:

Hr. Norris.

9

HR. NORRIS:

I think it is a

10

good idea to agree to disagree irt this sensei

11

but the more fundamental argument that Hr.

12

Lansdale and I haven are havingn as you suggested!

13

relates to termsi the term "isolated!" what it

14

means to be an isolated utility and

15

"interconnection."

16

Just to give you an example:

17

The City understands the term interconnection .

18

to legally mean what CEI refers to as a

19

synchronous interconnection.

20
21

22
23

24
25

As we understand it in the industry! it is a
connection between two systems which! in which
electricity flows back and forth across the

connection.

, .

Now! in the CEI vernacular! they do not

agree to that as a definition! a synchronous

n

I
interconnection! as what I just described! and we
are going to have a lot of testimony on the

question of interconnection! and I think it
would promote the jury’s understanding if they

knew clearly what it is that the witness is
referring to and what the witness is not
referring to.
THE COURT:

I agree with you.

I would certainly — it certainly would be
advantageous to this jury but! gentlemen! if

the definition of a vertically integrated
utility is a question of fact that will be in

issue! then that is something that will have to

go to a jury.
HR. LANSDALE:

l.fl defines

integrated utility.

• The problem is that many of the documents!
particular people representing the term

interconnection in a different sense than that

which Hr. Norris would like to have accepted as
a universal definition! and I will not do it.
THE COURT:

suggest.

All I can do is

If you can’t stipulate! that is all

right with me.
All I am telling you is then it becomes an

20

1

issue of factn so we have resolved that aspect of

2

itn but you haven’t addressed tny other inquiry as

3

to the advisability of preparing a display chart

4

with the agreed definitions.

5

HR. LANSDALE:

I have no objection.

6

THE COURT:

Hr. Norrisf

7

HR. NORRIS:

I have no objections

S
9

to itn your Honor.
I think that there are going to be so many

10

charts in this case that I don't think a chart is

11

going to be as important on this issue as on other

12

issues.

13

It may be that we could have a piece of

14

paper — I don't know whether your Honor will

15

permit the.jury to take notes --

16

THE COURT:

No.

17

HR. NORRIS:

— or have documents

18
19

of any kind?
THE COURT:

Noi nor will they be

20

able to have documents at that time.

21

I suggested that a chart of agreed terminology be

22

prepared and placed in a position where it will be

23

available to all of the jurorsn and if they are

24

desirous of referring to a definition when it is

25

used in the presentation of testimony! they may

That is why

21
1

do so just by looking at the charti and that will

2

remain throughout the proceedings in a fixed spot.

3

Needless to sayi I have noticed during the

4

course of other trials that other charts are

5

usedi and counsel have a way of interchanging

6

charts and taking them down and putting them up.

7

8

9

tIR. LANSDALE:

Ide will prepare

such a chart and see what it looks like.

HR. NORRIS:

Firstn we haveto

10

discuss what is going to be on itn and then we

11

will report back.

12
13
14

THE COURT:

Hake it big enough

so you can look at it.

riR. NORRIS:

One of the other

15

things.we have to address is that we have got

16

very large exhibits.

17

Ide have measured the areai and Joe has been

18

very helpful in assisting usi and we do need to

19

get your Honor’s view as to what would be

20

appropriate in terms of physical location of some

21

of these things.

22

THE COURT:

Idelli certainlyn

23

take it up at the appropriate timen and it is a

24

matter, that we should agree on.

25

fir. Norrisn when you talk about "large

as

exhibits" can you give me your definition of
"large exhibits"?

HR. NORRIS:

Ne have prepared

what we call universal charts of the operation of

the equipment over at riuny Light.

They consist of different boilers and the
different turbines through the period that is

relevant to this case.
I. think we start in 1570 through 157bn and

we havei . through the cooperation with counseb
we have made available to CEI’s counsel the daily

operating boiler data from which this information
was takeni so they can check the accuracy of this
visual representation.
Nowi because there are so many boilers and so

many turbinesi we found we could not compress a
year’s worth of information on anything less than

t feeti so that — we have 7 such charts that were
b feet in lengthn and we have extra easels so that

we can put up the three-year stand up beside
anothern and they will fit together.
THE COURT:

Are the cards b-foot

HR. NORRIS:

Yesi b foot by

long?

about 3 feetn and then we have one exhibiti the

23
1

largest exhibit we haven and it is probably 7

2

feetn which undertakes to show a generation

3

history across the entire period of time-

4

It is a ED-year exhibitn and we thought

5

that many of these exhibits would fit right

6

there {indicating]-n and we also thought that

7

there would be room here {indicating!n if we

8

had to put up three next to each othern and all

9

the members of the jury and the Court and counsel

10

11
12
13

could see itTHE COURT:

I don’t think that

would be a problem-

I would suggestn■howevern that the mechanics

14

of displaying them to the jury be worked out

15

beforehand.-

16

17

HR. NORRIS:

Ue are trying to do

thatn your Honor-

18

THE COURT:

All right!

19

HR. NORRIS:

Your Honori we have

20

brought over the exhibits this morningn and they

21

have just arrivedn so if you would like to see

22

what we are talking abouti they are available.

23

THE COURT:

All right.

24

HR. NORRIS:

Jack and I will

25

keep going.

54

1

{Recess taken.!

2

THE COURT:

Gentlemenn could I

3

direct your attention for a moment to

4

Stipulation No. IB.lLf

5

lilhat does the second sentence of that

6

stipulation mean?

7

State regulatory commission or agency ordered

8

CEI to participate in CAPCO.

9

organizations strongly"—

10

11

12
13
14
15

16
17

It reads:

HR. WEINER:
your Honor.

"No Federal or

Houeveri such

Yes.

Thank you-,

Strongly recommended?

HR. LANSDALE:

I didn’t get the

question.

HR. WEINER:

There’s a word

missing in-lB.lL.

I think it’s recommended-, your Honor.
will check.

18

HR. LANSDALE:

13.L?

19

THE COURT:

13.111-, second

20
21

22

23
24
25

I

sentence-. Hr. Lansdale.
HR. WEINER:

"Encouraged" is the

word-, your Honor.
HR. LANSDALE:

I missed that.
■{Long pause.!'

Yeah-, encouraged.

as
1

THE COURT^

Gentlemen! at your

2

leisure! I have completed reviewing the 41 pages

3

of the proposed stipulations-

4

your differences?

5

HR. NORRIS:

Have you resolved

Ue haven’t resolved

6

all of them because there are things we have to

7

go back and check.

8

THE COURT:

All right.

9

FIR. NORRIS:

Ue’ve got these

10

three filings we have made! your Honor! that

11

represent things we have agreed on! things that

12

are still under discussion and things we have

13

agreed to refuse each other.

14

I don’t know how Jack and Jim feel about it!

15

but I think we would make more time — ue can

16

resolve a lot of these things if we still will

17

meet and keep going the way we are going-

18
t

THE COURT:

Fine.

19

FIR. NORRIS:

Ide can probably do

20

it more efficiently if ue do it back in our

21

office rather than here in the courtroom.

22
23

THE COURT:

Fir. Lansdale! do

you have any objection to that?

24

FIR. LANSDALE:

No! sir.

25

THE COURT: .

I have no objection

at

1

to the location where you people want to do these

2

things.

I would suggest that you address immediately

3

4

the stipulations that are presently under

5

consideration! which represents another! what?

6

la pages?

7

HR. LANSDALE:

There are a number

8

more.

9

them! if your Honor please! is that some of these

The problem with respect to a number of

t

10

we didn’t get until quite late in the weekend.

11

THE COURT:

All right.

12

tlR. LANSDALE:

In some of them we

13

have to check with our people we are unable to

14

locate.

15

Honor wishes to take up other items.

16

So that checking could go on if your

However! I agree with tlr. Norris that we

17

could more quickly do this if we were in a place

18

where we could get to our people by telephone!

19

and so on.

20

THE COURT:

Gentlemen! I would

21

prefer to do it wherever it is most convenient for

22

yourselves and more expeditious for yourselves.

23

Idhat I am interested in is determining the

24
25

areas where controversy has been eliminated.
tlR. NORRIS:.

Right.

.

a?
1

And if you would

THE COURT:

2

rather go back to your offices and make

3

necessary telephone calls and get the

4

necessary people inn you are free to do

5

the

so.

It would help-.

MR. NORRIS:

6

too -- I don’t know if I understood

7

suggestion earlier-,but you haveapparently

8

prepared some proposed stipulations you think

9

the parties should enter into-

your

10

the court:

Yes-

11

HR. NORRIS:

And if we could

' 12

13

have those —

the

COURT:

Well-, as I say-,

the

14

proposed stipulations I have have been taken from a

15

review of the pleadings and they are not

16

stipulations in the strict

17

admissions.

18
19
20

hr.

NORRIS:

sense.They are

liJell-. it might

promote efficiency —

the

COURT:

I don’t have them

They are allhandwritten at the

21

typed up.

22

moment.

23

appears to me that most of the areas I have

24

addressed-have been, covered in your stipulations.

25

Did that over the weekend.

And it

-Howeveri I will compare what I have with
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what you have presented me andi in the meantimen
I will expedite the preparation of the proposed
voir dire examination so that you people will

have a copy of it late today so that you can

give it your attention, and give whatever

suggestions you may have or make whatever
exceptions you may have so that by tomorrow it

will be in final draft so I can prepare 2DD or

3DD copies of it.•
So you are free to go-

impassen I am here-

If you are at an

That’s why I am here.

fIR. NORRIS:

Are there other

matters the Court wants to take up before we

finish the fact stipulations^
THE

court:

The fact

stipulation! to men gentlemen! is the most

important part of the entire preliminary

proceeding because stipulations of fact

represent the areas on which counsel have
agreed that will eliminate the necessity for

taking evidence.
So I am desirous of having you address this

aspect of the pretrial preparation and give it
your full attention until we have resolved it.
The other areas! the exhibits and so forth!
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as I sayi we will take up in due order-

HR. NORRIS:

,

I would propose

that we try to finish this afternoon all of our
work on these joint stipulations and see if we
can’t come in tomorrow with a fresh document
that we feel we would be able to work overi that

perhaps that would reflect the agreement that we
are able to achieve before the day is over.

MR. LANSDALE:

I think perhaps we

can finish this during today.
I want to raise one other point:
I had hopedi. if your Honor pleasen and I
expected it would be over the back of objections
to the admissibility of classes of exhibitsn and

this is the way that we have approached thatn and

perhaps something could be done to sharpen the
issues a little bit and thus reduce the bulk.

For example! we are running a tremendous
number of exhibits that deal with — and some
stipulations — that deal with the desire and
effort of the Illuminating Company to purchase

Muny Light-

I asked Mr- Norris a day or two ago — I
forget which day —whether he was contending
that the purchase of Muny Light was. a violation of

30
the antitrust laui and he said he wasn’t taking

any position on it.
HR. NORRIS:

Under Section 7-

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

I can

only listen to one person speaking at the same
timen and this gentleman over here can only

record one person talking at the same timen so if
you would just —

fIR. LANSDALE:

If he is not taking

a position on thatn I think this gets us a long
wayi at least in my viewn of approaching the

issues.

Similarlyn it is apparent to me that Hr.
Norrisi that his contention is that we were

guilty of various predatory acts and sought by
unfair and predatory meansi to use the antitrust
swear wordsi to eliminate or reduce competition
with Huny Lightn and he is claiming a violation
of the antitrust lawsi and that is a clear issue.

I would assume that-i based upon his view of

the purchasen that he would not contendi or at
least would not take the position as to whether
attempts to do something to Huny Light by fair

competition is a violation of the antitrust lawsi

and if we could get those kinds of things

31
settled

THE COURT:.
issue-

Therein lies the

What is your definition of "fair" and

what is your definition of "predatory"?
HR. LANSDALE:

I don’t want to

reach that question now-

THE COURT:

I understand what

you are saying.
HR. LANSDALE:

It seems to me that

it would be a lot of guidance to me in sharpening
the issuesn and we can’t get this done too early.

HR. NORRIS:

One of the problems

that would arise in addressing your question!
Jacki is that it is our position that many of the

things that the Illuminating Company did with

respect to Huny Lighti whether or not taken

individually! were violations or might have been
violations! but the sum of those actions

constituted violations.

THE COURT:

Gentlemen! please.

I certainly would be amenable to considering
limiting the issues! gentlemen! but why don’t we
do one thing at a time! and address each of these

milestones in their order! and when we get

resolved with one!, we will go on to. the other.

32
As I indicated! I think one of the most
important aspects is a resolution of the
stipulations! and that can be a stepping stone
to a consideration of the exhibits! and together

that may be a stepping stone! gentlemen! to

limiting the issues! but in a sense your
stipulations and your approach to stipulating
exhibits may resolve some of these things.
So at the appropriate time — it may be

while the jury is filling out those
questionnaires! and you can give me something to

think about! and I will entertain your arguments

and suggestions.

I think it is a fine

suggestion.
The more of these matters! gentlemen! that we

can resolve through stipulation! that can be
presented to the jury in a concise and

understandable manner! I think it is going to
benefit both sides to this case in the sense that

the jury will be more inclined and more capable

of understanding what the case is about.
MR. NORRIS:

May I inquire! your

Honor! how do you — I have never tried a case in
your court before —r how do you permit the

stipulations to be used by counsel? — to be read

33
to the jury at any time counsel pleases?
THE COURT:

klelli my practice

has been to permit counsel to agreei if they cani
as to the manner in which they are desirous of

having the Court approach iti approach this .

subject.

I have found in the past that the most *
effective way of doing iti so that it is

presented in context to the juryn is for counsel
to predetermine the time that various stipulations

should be presented to the juryn and I have no

problem just reading the stipulation at that
appropriate time to the juryi and I believen

coming from the Courtn rather than counseli I

believe that is more effective as far as the jury

is concerned.
Needless to sayn once in evidence! and at
the appropriate timen both sides will be free to
argue the result from the stipulation.

Do you have any objections to that proceedings?
HR. NORRIS:

No.

I have nonei and

I think Jack and I should talk about it.
HR. LANSDALE:

lile intend to present

our objections to the various items in the

stipulations in writing.
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1
2
3

4

THE COURT:

You mean as to

relevancyl’

riR. LANSDALE:

Yesi relevancy and

materiality and certain competency}

5

THE COURT:

Just so long as all

6

of us understand what a stipulation is-

7

want to get into that.controversy -

8
9

I don't

I understand that both sides have reserved .

their rights to object to relevancy and

10

materialityn and that is finei and if there is

11

nothing furthern gentlemen —

12

HR. NORRIS:

Would it be your

13

intention to'make rulings on admissibility of

14

exhibits this week before the jury is impaneled?

15

16

17

THE COURT:

I would like very

much to do thatn Hr- Norris.

If the issue of relevancy and materiality is

18

presented in the context of a question of lawi

19

yesn I would; howeveri I have foundi and I am

20

sure both counsel will agreei that relevancy and

21

materiality are really issues that the Court must

22

consider within the context of the evidence as

23

it has been developed to the point when the

24

proposedn either testimony or exhibitn is

25

presented.

3S
An exhibit may be completely irrelevant and

inadmissible or immaterial within one context of

the trialn and within one time frame of the trial

and that same bit of evidence! testimony or
exhibit! may at a subsequent time in that trial!
due to the evolution of the evidence! become

material.
I would love to rule on these matters
completely before we impanel the jury-

It is in

your best interest! and you have the right to

object as to relevance and materiality.

HR- LANSDALE:

There are certain

classes of exhibits that we believe offer a law
*

question or place a law question.
THE COURT:

I have no problem

with that! of having them within a strictly legal

context! if that is the context in which in fact
they are presented.

Just so you will know how I am going to

rule -- my procedure — rather! I should say my
approach to the problem would be the same as I

would rule upon a motion for summary judgment.
tlR. LANSDALE:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Which would be that

there’ is no material conflict as to any material

3b
fact-

HR. LANSDALE:
THE COURT:

Yesn I understand.
considering the

position of the adverse party

MR. LANSDALE:

Ide hope to present

one or two items this week
THE COURT:

Ide are going to have

plenty of timen gentlemenn and as I sayi I will be
here if you-want to come back at any time or call
me on the telephone.

HR. NORRIS:

Jack what we filed here this morning?
MR. LANSDALE:

Idhat did you file?

MR. IdEINER

The stipulation.

HR. NORRIS:

Didn’t we also file

the objections?
HR. IdEINER:

HR. LANSDALE:

Ide will as soon as we

THE COURT:

Gentlemen! one issue

has been brought to my attention -- I shouldn’t
say "an issuen" it may be a "something" that has

been brought to my attention! namely! I understand
that the City has filed its witness list! and CEI
has not.
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1

HR. LANSDALE:

Ide have it with us-

2

THE COURT:

Fine-

3

Nowt

query:

Is it your desiren is it the

4

desire of counsel for the Court to retain the

5

witness list in camerai or are you going to

6

exchange?

7
8

riR- LANSDALE:

Ide had in mind

exchanging.

9

MR. NORRIS:

Yes-

0

THE COURT:

And similarly with

1

your trial briefsi if you are going to submit

2

trial briefsi I have no fixed rule as to

3

exchanging or having them in camerai either way.

4
5
6

HR. NORRIS:
exchange.

Ide are proposing to

-

HR. LANSDALE:

Ide expect to have

7

ours before the day is. over or at the latest

8

tomorrow morning.

9

THE COURT:

Keeping in mind that

0

I will make available to you the voir dire questions

1

as soon as they are completed —

2

HR. NORRIS:

3

Ide have the exhibits out in the halli and

One other thing:

4

because we are not crowded this morning on timei

5

if your Honor would' like to look at. those nowi we

¥

3fi

could discuss whether or not we can take them back
or leave them here.
We have got a logistical problem-

riR. LANSDALE:

We have got a set of

each of the parties’ exhibits in these cabinets.

fIR. NORRIS:

We have got one

colori and they have got anotheri but the exhibits
I am talking about are in the halli and you might

want to come out and take a looki and we have got
to take them back to our offices-

Whyf

THE COURT:

Are they the

same exhibit that you have heref
NR.

NORRIS:

No.

THE

COURT:

Why don’t you stack

them heref •
HR.

NORRIS:

at them first?

Would you like to

They are out in the hall.

HR.

LANSDALE:

Oh-, the big ones-

THE

COURT:

Yes-, certainly.

CThereupon the Court and attorneys for all

parties retired to the hallway adjoining the
courtroom to examine the above-referred-to

exhibits.I
{Thereupon luncheon recess ensued-l

look
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THE CLERK:

The City of

Cleveland versus Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Company! C7S-StO.

fIR. NORRIS:

Sorry-i your Honori

for being a little late.
THE COURT:

Gentlemen! have we

made any progress on the stipulations?

HR. NORRIS:

Your Honor! we have.

Ue met yesterday afternoon! and I believe that
by noon today we could have a new document prepared

that we could then go over! but I do think it would
be more efficient if we go back to our offices and
do that.

THE COURT:

All right.

Before we do that — I am sorry — hr.

Lansdale?

riR. LANSDALE:

Yes! your Honor.

I wanted to address that commentI wanted -to say that I agree that we made
substantial agreements.

There are two or three stipulations

outstanding on which we owe them an answeri and

one we are prepared to answer now! and one we will

4D
1

be prepared right after noon — welln the last two

2

will be prepared immediately after the lunch hour;

3

and I for one uould prefer to go forward this

4

morning in any event on other issues-

5

THE COURT:

Uelli I would like to

6

take under consideration any comments that address

7

the proposed voir dire questionnaire at this timen

8

so that we’can prepare these things in

9

anticipation of the jury panel tomorrow.

.0
,1

I take it that counsel have had an opportunity
of reviewing iti Hr- Norrisf

j

I
j

.2

HR. NORRIS:

Yesi your Honor-

.3

THE COURT:

Do you have comment?

.4

HR. NORRIS:

Ue have one general

.5

commentn and then we have suggestions on five of

.6

the specific questions.

.7

|

Our general comment-i your Honori is that

.8

using this approach is of — has a lot of benefit

.9

and a lot of good sense to iti but one of the

:o

negatives that seems to us to exist in this

;i

procedure is that counsel and the parties would

;2

not have a chance to look at the panel when they

!3

are considering! for example-i "Have you ever had a

:4

claim against the Cityn or against CEIn or have you

!5

been involved in.lawsuitsi" and so forth; and

5

|
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sometimes the demeanor of the person who is
responding to the question is important.

And in order to try to combine the benefits
of the system with a way to get around the point

that I am raisingn we would like to suggest to
your Honor that if this is donei then supposing
you cut 75 offn or by agreement we somehow get
down to 15St

for examplei and then with that 125

sitting next Tuesdayi or whenever! if your Honor
would repeat the questions orallyi even though

they have already answered them in a questionnaire
that would give the parties and counsel an,

opportunity to see the whole shown in effecti so

it would cure any kind of objections that one

might have .to seeing the kind of nuances and the
springs to action that, might cause the person to
check yes or no on a questionnaire•

That is one suggestion that we would make-i
and I could sit down and come back with a specific
suggestion if you would like.

THE COURT:

Just tell me what

other suggestions you have.

fIR. NORRIS:

In Question 13 we

would like to urge that the Court strike the

parenthetical expression! "public utility!" as

that is perhaps a word of art and lawi but
because there is a privately owned utility
company being sued by a publicly owned utility

companyn we believe that just asking them toi

"State the name of the electric power company
from which you currently receive electrical
servicei" and then the statements are set forthn

and we think the two words "public utility"
should be stricken..
In Question 54 — I must sayi we don’t feel

strongly about this.

Ue were.not sure why this question was in
theren and maybe it does serve a purposei but it

escapes our notice.
Ide don’t feel terribly strongly about thatn

but it did occur to us that perhaps that is an
unnecessary question-

THE COURT:

I am not hung up

on that question.

The only reason I put it in there was that
there have been demonstrations and certain

adversary positions taken by various segments of
society against nuclear generating plants.

That is purely a suggestion on my part.

•You are involved with nuclear generation^
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HR. LANSDALE:

Ue would ask the

question remaini if your Honor please.
You must remember that the late Mayor

instigated litigatjLon against CEI to close down
a nuclear power plant because of its proposed

dangers from itn and did so publicly in the
context of the litigation.

You may proceedn

THE COURT:

Mr. Norris.

I am sorry to have interrupted you.

MR. NORRIS:

.

My colleague points

out in 13-At and perhaps it is a very minor point
— "Cleveland Municipal Light. Plant" -- and

actually it is "Municipal Electric Light and Power
THE COURT:

"Light and Power" --

"Cleveland .Municipal Light and Power"?
MR. NORRIS:

Yes.

tile typically

think of it ourselves as a system with the plant
just being the generating portion of iti so we are
going to be using Muny Light mostly in the casei

and we feel it would be less confusing! but if
that language is going to be usedi HELP —
THE COURT:

klelln would

prefer HELP and Muny Light?
MR. NORRIS:

’ IHE. COURT: •

Muny Light.
All right.

you

4M

riR. NORRIS:

In c3uestion HS we

think it is important to put in after "flunicipal

Electric" — to put inn "Municipal Electric

Light Systemi" after "Municipal Electric Light
Systemi" with something liken "The Municipal
Electric Light System as a governmental unit is
exempt from certain taxes."

MR. LANSDALE:

bJe have no objection

to that.

MR. NORRIS:
THE COURT:

All right.
,

Just a moment.

MR. NORRIS:

I am sorry.

THE COURT:.

All right.

MR. NORRIS:

In (Juestion S7 we

Proceed.

ask the* wordsi "Non-taxpaying " be eliminated
because the idea has already been communicated.
lilell-. I think that

THE COURT:

that is a proper question! and that one will

remain•

Go ahead.
MR. NORRIS:

\

The only other

comment is Question HTn your Honor.

THE COURT:

Just a moment.

MH.

Go ahead.
MR. NORRIS:,

hJe think that the

six-ueek prediction is much too optimistic and

we think that if we could get away from the
reference to a specific number of weeks it would

If noti then we would ask that it be

be helpful.

increased to 10 or something like that.

In addition! a jurori a person considering
his or her service! would probably want to know

what kind of schedule is involved! and we would

ask that the Court consider including in
(Juestion .4'1 what the typical number of days a

week and number of hours a day — what the typical
schedule would be that the jurors would be looking

toward.
That I will not

THE COURT:

accept because the Court may be required to adopt

varying schedules! depending upon the progress of

the case.

It is not inconceivable that we will

have hearings on Saturdays and it is not

inconceivable that the Court will hold the jury
beyond 4:0D o'clock or 4:30! depending upon the

progress of the trial.
That is not a basis for excluding a juror
in any event.

A juror will serve at the

convenience of the Court.

The Court can go so

far"as to sequester the jury.

So I am not going to include anything about

the schedule.

I retain the option to determine

what the schedule will be and I don’t want to
mislead the jurors-

riR. NORRIS:

Those are our

suggestions.
THE COURT:

Incidentally-, the

words "public utility" may be stricken from —
Idhat question was thatf
LAU CLERK SCHHIDT:

13.

THE COURT:

Take that out.

Nowt tlr. Lansdalef
HR. LANSDALE:

If your Honor

please-i we would request two items:

That the

city in which the juror resides be specifically

requested —
THE COURT:

I’m sorry.

HR. LANSDALE:

I would appreciate

it if you would specifically ask the jurors to
designate the city in which they live-

It is not

always apparent from the address in the Greater
Cleveland area.

THE COURT:

Uhat question is

HR. LANSDALE:'

That’s Question

that?

M7
Number 1THE COURT:

That’s no problem.

HR. LANSDALE:

Secondlyn ue would

request that the jurors’ age be asked for.

I

don’t know whether there is any difficulty about
that or not.

I would like not to be blamed for

iti your HonorTHE COURT:

I’m going to put in

heren "Hr- Lansdale would like to know the age of
all jurors."

HR. LANSDALE:

Ue have no further

suggestions.
THE COURT:

Very well.

Ue will

make the necessary corrections here.
Gentlemen! I generally permit a half hour for
opening statements.

about an hour.

In this case I am thinking

I think both counsel ought to be

able to make a concise statement generalizing the
proof that they intend to present during the course

of the triali and I will entertain comments on that.
Yes-i rir. Norrisf

HR. NORRIS:

I think that is too

short! your Honor.

THE COURT:

Uhat do you suggest?

i think it’s too long.

L

2

3
4
5
3

4fi
flR. NORRIS:

I realize that no

person is —

THE COURT:

I have found that

the longer lawyers talki the more redundant they
z
become*

HR. NORRIS.:

bJelln what is the

7

Court’s practice in terms of morning breaks?

3

you generally —

)

THE COURT:

Certainly.

Idhat we

)

don gentlemen — I will give you my schedule-i

L

barring unforeseeable circumstances.

?

Ide will convene promptly at 5:1S.

Do

Ide will

3

have a break in the morning between 1D:3O and

I

1D:4St which is generally a ID or IS-minute break.

5

Ide will recess for lunch at noon.

Ide will return

at 1:30 with an afternoon break between 2:30 and

2:4S and we will adjourn promptly! hopefully!
3

each day at 4:30.

)

Hopefully! we will not have to go into Saturdays

)

but it may require that we do go into Saturdays.

L

But that! generally! is the schedule.

)

}

I
3

That will be five days a week.

Idith that in mind! counsel can plan'

accordingly.
HR. NORRIS:

Idell! I asked that

question because I think it’s an imposition on

any group to ask them to sit uninterrupted for a

tuo-and-a-half-hour period-, which is the period

I had in mind for the openingI would urge that the Court consider at
least a two hour time allotment because I have
carefully organized this case and. believe me.

I have already determined the material that I
think the jury must be aware of and. while I do
not intend to ramble or be redundant — I will

certainly do my best to. avoid that -- I do feel

a need to have at least- a two-hour period, and

even without going into the subject of damagesIt was niy intention in the opening statement

to virtually make no comment at all about
damages, and I wonder if your Honor would consider

kind of a second opening when we get to the damage

part of the case-

THE court:
for that.

There is no necessity

I am sura that you can devise a method

of handling the damage aspect of the case in your
opening statement.

Most counsel in most opening

statements under our existing precedent of
generalized damages, because the pleadings do not

goto the jury, damages are not limited by the
prayer, and generally under the law it's a matter

that is more properly addressed in closing
I

argument after the proof is in-

Butn as I sayi

I am not attempting in any way to indicate to you

how you should handle the question.

klhat are your comments on opening statements
Hr. Lansdalef

HR. LANSDALE:

I have twoi if your

Honor please.
Unlike ilrr Norrisi I don't know what I am
going to say in opening statement until we hear
what he says.

THE COURT:

If he talks for two

and a half hdursi you are going to talk for three
hours.
MR. LANSDALE:

No-, sir-. I am not-,

because my theory of the case doesn’t involve

that and an hour certainly is adequate for me. ‘
However-. I want to add something here.

Ide

have been spending a lot of time examining the
proposed exhibits.

I have now had an opportunity

to read Ilr. Norris's brief and the discursive

new reports of some of his damage experts-, and I
would hope-, if your Honor please-, that before

nr. Norris gets up to present his opening

statement that we will have had an opportunity to

SI

at least attempt to resolve some of what I think
of as generic objections-, that is-, not the specific
exhibits as such but kinds of exhibits-, and have
some argument here as to the theory of the case-,

because in my view of the case there is a very

substantial number of exhibits-, substantial

material which Hr. Norris obviously intends to

use which are not admissible and which I have
some hopes that your Honor will rule or be able

to rule in advance on before we get to opening

statement as a part of this preliminary pretrial
in connection with an attempt to sharpen issues

which is not an unusual thing in antitrust
immediate pretrial discussions.

I am not adverse to

THE COURT:

entertaining that.
You still haven’t answered my question.

HR. LANSDALE:
for me.

One hour is ample

But I have no objection to (1r. Norris

having more time than that.
THE COURT:

it an hour and a half.

Supposing we make

That way-, if we start

promptly at 5:15-, you can go uninterrupted
until say 1Q:MS.

rtR. NORRIS: .

Could I bargain

sa
1

two hoursi your Honor?*

a half hour.

’4

I
1

MR. NORRIS:

Uelln can’t blame me

5

for trying.

6

if you would let me have it.

7

I would certainly appreciate two hours

THE COURT:

lilelli reallyn try to

8

limit yourself to one hour and forty-five minutesn

9

and if you go overi you are going to go over.

10

11

i

You already bargained

THE COURT:

2

3

}
I
j

j

j
JI
|

But you are going to see that you are going to end
up rambling.

12

i

You known we go through this every trial I

13

have and counsel says-, "Judge-, I need it-," and

|

14

most times they sit down and they have time left

|

15

over.

I

16

17
18

19

20
21

22
23
24

25

But-, needless to say-, gentlemen-, the Court

I

to the attention of counsel-, that the Court

i
I
I

retains the prerogative to instruct the jurors

I

on the law and requires counsel at the outset of

■

the case to limit themselves to an opening

fl

makes a distinction between opening statements
and closing arguments-, and the Court brings this

statement and to defer their closing arguments
until all of the evidence is in.
counsel will conform to that.

I trust both

I
I

So we will leave it at an hour and MS

1

2

minutes•
Your Honori are you

HR. NORRIS:

3

4

going to address today the matter of the

5

preliminary jury instruction?
You had indicated in an earlier order that

6
7

the Court was favorably inclined towards

8

preliminary jury instructions.

THE COURT?

9
LO

That's righti and

I am about to read you that preliminary statement.
MR. NORRIS:

.1

When would that be

.2

given to the juryi before opening or after

.3

opening?

.4
.5

THE COURT:

statement?.
MR. NORRIS:

.6

.7

THE COURT:

’1

!2
!3
!4
!5

The preliminary jury

HR. NORRIS:

I

1
I
|

This preliminary

statement will be given to the jury panel —

’0

|

|

instructions.

.8
.9

The preliminary

?

Right.

I understand

|

fl
J
s I

that.

THE COURT:

Before the voir dire

! II

commences.

NR. NORRIS:

I

I see.

So that then

what you are about to read to us is the only

.‘'I
I

preliminary jury instructions on the law that

they will hear?
NOi that is not .

THE COURT;

correct.

Well-, then let me

MR. NORRIS:

hold my question.

I will raise it again.

THE COURT:

"This is a civil

action initiated by the City of Clevelandn
hereinafter referred to as

’The Cityi’ a

municipal corporation! against the defendant!

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company!
hereinafter referred, to as

’CEI.*"

The City’s complaint is filed pursuant to

Sections M and lb of the Clayton Act! being

IS United States Code! Sections IS through 2b!

and asks damages for alleged past and continuing
violations of and to restrain the defendant from
alleged future violations of Section 2 of the

Sherman Antitrust Act! being IS United States
Code! Section 2! which provides that:

"It shall be illegal for any person to
monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part

of the trade or commerce among the several
states or with foreign nations."

"Title IS! United States Code! Section IS!

authorizes:

"Any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
and shall recover the damages by him- sustained."

Plaintiff states that it is a municipal

corporation organized and existing under and by

virtue of the Constitution and laws of the State
of Ohio and the charter adopted by its
electorate.

"The City identifies the defendant CEI as a
privately owned stock corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Ohioi

with its principal office in Cleveland! that is
an electric public utility engaged in the business

of generating! purchasing! selling and

distributing electric power in interstate
commerce or! more particularly! including a
substantial portion of Northeast Ohio and/or

within the environs of the city.

"The violation charged by the City in its
complaint! for the most part! it is asserted

have been and are carried out within the

Northern District of Ohio wherein the defendant
transacts business by and through its authorized

Sb

1

officersn directors-! agents-i employees or

2

representatives who are actively engaged in the

3

manageraenti direction or control of defendant’s

4

enterprises.

5

J
}

i
j

"Plaintiff in its complaint asserts in

6

substance that it produces and distributes

7

electric power within the City of Cleveland for

8

street lighting and for sale to residential and

9

other customers; that the defendant CEI also

j

»
#■
}
■
j

LO

produces and.distributes electric power for sale

LI

to residential and other customers in addition to

L2

buying and. selling electric power through

L3

interconnections from and to certain other

L4

investor-owned-i privately-owned-i electric

H
11
I

L5

companies! which electric power may originate

||

L6

from or be used in the States of Ohioi

L7

Pennsylvania-! Indiana-! flichigan-! Virginia-!
West Virginia-! Kentucky or Tennessee.

J
I

i|

’’■1
li
jl
Il

L8

L9

"The City also states that the defendant

JO

CEI-! as a member of the Centr.al Area Power

I

JI

Coordination Group -Chereinafter referred to as

■

J2

CAPCOl is a joint owner with certain other

fl

’3

investor-owned electric companies of certain

■

’4

generating facilities located in Ohio and

■

>5

Pennsylvania-! which CEI and other electric

a

i

S7
1

companies financed and built or are in the process

1

2

of building from which electric power is or can be

■

3

generated.

4

"Plaintiff alleges further that it directly

1

5

competes with CEI through its municipal light

*

6

system -thereinafter referred to as ’Huny Light’

jj

7

or *nELP’}.

8

1

"The Cityn among other thingsn charges that

1

9

the defendant has engaged in a continuing attempt

i

0

to monopolize and has monopolized wholesale and

i

L

retail sale and distribution of electric power in

,|

2

interstate trade and commerce more particularlyn

||

3

in a substantial portion of Northeastern Ohio and

-|

4

the local Cleveland market in violation of Section

I'l

5

2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act in the following

□

respects:

1

"■Cal

.

Defendant refused to wheel or to permit

1

.I
'’I
;1

I'S

3

the transmission of electric power from other

.9

3

power suppliers to plaintiff-, or from plaintiff

a

3

to any other' electric utility system which was or

*n

L

is an actual or potential competitor of the

||

defendant-, over transmission lines owned or

;■

?
3
1
3

controlled by the defendants

"Cbl

9

Defendant-refused to deal with

plaintiff in the power exchange market-, except on

A

sa

terms that would maintain domination and
exclusive control by the defendant over electric
power supply in the area served by it and that

would be harmful to the interests of the

plaintiffi

"fcl

Defendant refused to admit plaintiff

to membership in CAPCO or to otherwise permit
plaintiff to have access to the benefits of

coordinated operations and development of any
other benefit of power pooling.or power exchange
servicesi

"<dJ

Defendant engaged in other activities

for the purpose and with the effect of restraining

and eliminating competition in. electric power and
energy.
"The City charges further that CEI’s attempt

to monopolize and its actual monopolization of

wholesale and retail sales and distribution of
electric power in Northeastern Ohio and more

particularly in Cleveland! Ohioi has prevented the

plaintiff fromi among other things:

"Cal

Obtaining an interconnection for

operation normally in parallel as that term may
be more fully defined by the evidencei

"■Cbl

Purchasing power and energy from

sources other than CEIi
Maintaining its generating units in

good operating conditioni
"■Cdl

Expanding its own generation with bulk

power supply which participates in economies of
scale available from , access to the power exchange

market•
"{el

Competing for industrial loads;

"•Cfl

Issuing bonds to finance improvements

and extensions of its system; .
"■Cgl

Utilizing the only available transmission

grid to obtain firm electric power in bulk form
sources other than defendant;

"■Chi

Utilizing the only .available transmission

grid to participate in the power exchange market;

"■Cil

Constructing transmission lines, to

interconnect its system with the electric system

of other cities to effect the limited power

exchange arrangements available thereby;
"Cjl

Providing continuing service to its

customers with CEI’s knowledge of the anticipated

and actual effect of service interruptions on the
ability of the City to retain its customers while
CEI held itself out.to provide service with few

interruptions to. these same customers;

bO
"fkl

Retaining as its customers a

substantial number or retail industrial and

large commercial customers who switched their
patronage to CEI as a result of frequent service

interruptions;
"•Cll

Achieving the growth in load it

would have achieved absent any anti-competitive

restriction in power exchange services"It is alleged by the City that that

that, foregoing conduct has permitted CEI to-,
among other things:

"CaJ

Monopolize trade and commerce.and

electric power in a portion of Northeastern

Ohio;
"■Cbl

-Preserve and expand a monopoly

position in the trade and commerce in the
electric power portion of Northeast Ohio;
"•CcJ

Monopolize the retail and wholesale

markets for electric firm power in a portion of
Northeast Ohio.

"Plaintiff asserts that as a direct and
proximate result of the unlawful conduct of CEI-,
plaintiff has incurred and continues to incur

excessive costs and-expenses it otherwise would
< , ••
»
not have had-, has lost sales it otherwise would

bl
have madsi and has sustained and continues to

sustain loss in the value of its businessn all

to its financial detriment for which it seeks
damages•

Answering the plaintiff's chargesn the
defendant admits that Sections 4 and lb of the

Clayton Act provide for the initiation of

antitrust actions both for damages and for

injunctions resulting from violations of

Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
"The defendant admits that it is a
privately owned stock corporation organized and

existing uhder the laws of the State of Ohio with

its principal office in Cleveland! Ohio; that it
is a public utility under the laws of the State of
Ohio and within the meaning of the Federal Power
Act; that it is subject to the jurisdiction of

the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio and of

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

fformerly the Federal Power Commission!; that as.
an electric power utility it is engaged in the

business of generating! purchasing! selling! and
distributing electric power in an area of
approximately l!700,square miles in Northeastern
Ohio!-including the City of Cleveland."

And now I have something here thati I don’t
known this may be controversialn and it statesn
"In interstate commerce."
MR. LANSDALE:

We take the position

that the retail distribution is not interstate

commercebJe admit that wholesale distribution is-, and

the so-called regional exchanges areTHE COURT:

You presently have a

motion before me on that?
MR. LANSDALE:

I have filed a brief

on the subject.
THE COURT:

Flay I ask if this is

a serious contentionf
HR. LANSDALE:

Yes-, it is serious-,

insofar as retail sales are concerned.
THE COURT:

All right-

Now continuing:

"CEI admits further that from time to time

it purchases power from or exchanges power with
other utilities with which it has interconnections

that it is a member of CAPCO-. a group of

utilities which have entered into contracts which

provided for certain joint planning and
construction of generating facilities-, as well as

providing certain mutual support in the

operation of their electric systems.
"CEI further admits that its together with
other CAPCO members is presently planning or has
under construction! generating units that are or

will be owned in common by some of the members
of CAPCO in varying proportions.
. "The defendant further admits that the City

is a municipal corporation organized and existing

under and by virtue of the Constitution and laws
of the State of Ohio and the charter adopted by

its electorate.
"CEI admits and avers that the City has
for many years engaged in the generation and
distribution of electric energy in and about the

City of Cleveland and in a proportion of the
environs of Cleveland and serves approximately

2Q percent of the electric customers within this

defined geographical area.
"CEI admits and avers further that the Cityi

through its fluny Light system directly competes

with defendant in the retail sale and distribution
of electric energy in a substantial area of
Cleveland and in a proportion of the environs of

Cleveland.

"The defendant specifically denies that it has

either directly or through its authorized officersi

directors! agents-i employees! or representatives
at any time or manner uhatsoever monopolized! or
attempted to monopolize the wholesale and retail

sale and distribution of electric power in
interstate trade and commerce! particularly in a
substantial portion of Northeastern Ohio and the
local Cleveland market in violation of Section 2

of the Sherman. Antitrust Act! as charged by the
plaintiff in its complaint.

"Further answering! CEI avers that in the

event the City suffered damages as charged in its
complaint! such damages directly and proximately
were caused by the poor condition of the City’s

generating facilities which were seldom operable
in recent years! the poor condition of its other
facilities! the incompetence and mismanagement of

the plaintiff city's operating pers-onnel! all of
which resulted in the City's inability to provide

continuous services to its customers! many of whom
switched their patronage to CEI as a result of

frequent service interruptions.
"Further answering! the defendant

specifically denies each and every allegation of

the plaintiff's complaint except those expnessedly
admitted to be true in its answer.
"In addition to the avermentSi admissionsn
and denials of its answer filed hereinn CEI in a

counterclaim against the City alleges that the

City is a municipal corporation and is engaged in
the sale of electric energy at retail within

certain areas of its boundaries in

direct

competition with CEIi that the City is using and

unless enjoined by this Courti will continue to
use unfair methods and practices of competition

against the defendant for the purpose of destroying
or preventing competition between themn in that the

City:
"Cal

Sells electric energy at retail for

less than the actual cost thereofn contrary to
the public policy of the State of Ohio for the
purpose of inducing the users of electric energy
to purchase or to continue to purchase such energy

from the plaintiff city rather from CEIi

"-CbJ

Offers special concessions and services

to certain favored customers! contrary to the
public policy of the State of Ohion without

offering such concessions and services in like

circumstances to others of its customers! for the

purpose of inducing such customers to purchase
or to continue to purchase electric energy from

the plaintiff city rather than from CEIi
"-CcJ

Unfairly utilizes its power to grant

or withhold or regulate the timing of or otherwise

manipulate the provisions of other municipal
services and licenses such as the supply of wateri
the issue of building permitsi the rearrangements

or repair of streets and sidewalksn the housing of

its activities and the like-i so as to induce or
coerce users or potential users of electric
energy within its service area to purchase or
continue to purchase electric energy from the
plaintiff city rather than from CEI.
"Defendant asserts further that it is

prevented by Ohio laws regulating public
utilities! which laws are not applicable to the

plaintiff cityn from meeting plaintiff’s

predatory practices.

"CEI asserts further that it has no remedy
except such as may be provided by this Court

against the plaintiff’s oppressive use of its

governmental powers to restrain competition
between CEI and the -City.

"Responding to-the counterclaim! plaintiff

City denies each and every allegation asserted by
the defendant CEI and requests that the defendant's
counterclaim be dismissedI thinki gentlemen! that that fairly

summarizes the claims and allegations contained in
the complaint and the ansuer and the reply, end

that will preface the voir dire examination.
■CAfter an interval-!
the court:

Now, gentlemen,

supposing - where is my work sheet, or - here
it is-

I have got it-

Nown gentlemen-, supposing we address ourselves
to the question - well, supposing we address

ourselves to the exhibits that have been presented.
I note*that I do not have a documentary
-1f hho Qvhibits oresented by the City
compendium of the exmoita pi =
at this time-

Well, gentlemen, since this is not the

ordinary case, I note that the exhibits are
confined and filed in the filing cabinets over

there {indicating!-

I am just trying to conceive of an orderly
manner in which to approach the issue of the

■ exhibits.

Do you have a worksheetf

me/morris:'

■

Ue have prepared the

ba
indexn your Honopi and if there is anything else

we should doi we want to cooperate-

THE COURT:

Do you have an indexi

rir- Lansdale?
MR. LANSDALE:

Ue have filed -- we

have an index by exhibitsi but we have filed a

memorandum specifying our objections to the

City’s exhibits by type of objection with reference
to specific exhibits.
In addition to thati I would like to present

to the Court in a more general way our objections

toi in effectn to two groups of exhibits which
overlap! of course-i and seek a ruling of the

Court on whether certain specific issuesn whichn

if the Court were to decide them as I think your
Honor should-i would eliminate a very substantial
number of exhibits as well as trial time-

THE COURT:

Uelli supposing we

address the objections if any, the accuracy or

authenticity! of proper exhibits at this point
in time! and then Hr- Lansdale! as I understand
your position! it is that you are desirous of

addressing some generalized classification of

exhibits! the relevance or materiality of a
certain class of exhibits?

HR. LANSDALE:

Yasi your Honor-

THE COURT:

— in which the

Court should consider ruling upon as a matter of
lauf

HR. LANSDALE:

Yes-, sir-

THE COURT:

All right.

Let’s

approach the question of objections to the
accuracy and authenticity of the exhibits.
HR. LANSDALE:

..I will ask Hr.

Hurphy to handle that.
THE COURT:

All rights and we

will permit the defendant first to object to your
exhibits and ’ —

HR. HURPHY:

Your Honori what we

have done in our objections is to itemize as
Objection It. those exhibits-, the authenticity of

which we are not able to ascertain.
I should say that in the last week'I have
had several meetings with lawyers for the City
where we have tried to resolve both their concerns

with authenticity objections to our exhibits and
vice versa-, and I think a fair amount of progress

has been done.
The process is, not complete as yet.

kJe both

are under present obligations to verify certain

specific exhibits and advise the other if we
continue to maintain the authenticity objections

that we raised with each othern I thinkn beginning
on July It of this yearn so that process is underwayi
and hopefully by meeting with counsel we will

resolve the remaining authenticity objections.
THE COURTi

You speak in

generalized terms — by what datef

HR. flURPHY:

By the end of the

weeki your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

HR. NORRIS:

Your Honorn we have

filedn as has' the defendant! specific objections

to the CEI objections! and what Hr. Hurphy has
alluded to -would also be applicable to the CEI

exhibits as well as the plaintiff’s exhibits.
Now! I suspect that that prediction is a

good one! that by the end of the week we should
have it done! because we are making progress.

At least as of the moment there are problems
such as the following:

An exhibit that we have marked that comes

from CEI’s file and perhaps a memorandum from A

to B! and then handwriting on the margin that we
cannot identify from the reading of. the document!

71

I

and that would lead us to believen and we think

I 2

any normal observer to believe-, that it was put

I 3

on the document by a CEI person, and in some cases

I

we believe the handwriting is that of either A or

I 5

B.

I®

Now-, we are endeavoring to agree on these

things between counsel so as to avoid bringing

that kind of problem to the Court.
There are many other exhibits that both CEI

r°

and the City have looked at together-, and we agreed

that whoever’s handwriting it is-, it is really not
relevant and we would white it out-, and that process

P

is still going forward-, and I think that we can

come back to your Honor at the end of the week with
a few of these areas that I have described that we

3.6

17 •
18

19
20

21
22
23

24
5

feel very important about it.
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•THE COURT:

Uhat is your

definition of a fewf

Uelli Hr- Nurphy

riR. NORRIS:

can check his recollection on this.

I suppose

it’s going to be SO documentsi in the range of
SO documents.

I’m not sure.

I shouldn’t

speculate.
THE COURT:

Idelli I am not asking

you to commit yourself to any figure-

I just

want to have some idea of time.

HR. NORRIS:

I think it's going to

be at least that.

THE COURT:

How long is it going

to take us to consider the documents?

How many

do you anticipated
HR. HURPHY:

Your Honorn I think

that’s a fair estimate as well as an estimate can

be made at the present time.

I am cautious of

estimating because one of the examples Hr. Norris

gave was handwriting on exhibits.

The practice we normally follow when we
encounter handwriting on an exhibit is to white

out the handwriting unless we are confident of
the person who wrote it because in most cases it
didn’t make any difference and we were more

73

interested in the typewritten version*

I think.the City initially determined not to

do that-, but in conferences last night and over
the weekend they would go back and see the
handwriting didn’t make any difference and would

do the same thing.

I think SO is a reasonable estimate of the
documents.
MR. NORRIS:

But neither of us i

bound to that number.
THE COURT:

No-, no.

I'm not

asking for that.

fIR. NORRIS:

Your Honor —

THE COURT:

Yes?

MR. NORRIS:

— Friday may be an

optimistic estimate with all of the other work*

Ue are going to have to review these questionnaires

Thursday night*

bJe will endeavor to get this

done but —
THE COURT:

Uelli if either side

had a limited number of personnel devoted to this
case-, .1 would be concerned about that-, but I am not

really concerned about that-, gentlemen.

The manpower

resources here should be more than adequate to move
the case along expeditiously.

Idelln all rightn gentlemen.

Then supposing

thatn here againn we- permit counsel to attempt

to resolve the controversies-! the remaining

controversies as concerns the authenticity and
accuracy of exhibits andi hopefullyn we will be
able to address these things on Saturday! or

Friday.

Nowt Hr. Lansdalei if you are desirous of
explaining to me your position more definitively

concerning these objections you are making as a
matter of law for certain categories of Plaintiff’s

exhibits! you may do so.

HR. LANSDALE:

Yes.

There are two

general classes of exhibits which, constitute rather

a large number.

All of them — almost all of them

deal with exhibits dated prior to the statute of
limitations period.

THE COURT:

Well! the Court

presently has before it motions concerning the

statute of limitations.
riR. LANSDALE:

That is the tolling.

THE COURT:

That’s correct.

HR. LANSDALE:

I’m not addressing

that specific —
THE COURT:

All right.

7S

HR- LANSDALE:
that specific aspect*

I am not addressing
And some of them subsequent

to the statute*

There are two general classifications of
exhibits.

There are quite a large number of

exhibits which.the Plaintiff proposes to usei and

I know from the discussions on stipulations and
the items contained in the stipulation it had to

do with various internal CEI documents! making
comments about or statements concerning the

intention of the various authors of the documents
as to riuny Light — a desire to purchase huny
Light! a desire to do other things looking towards

the limiting or elimination of competition between
the CEI and riuny Light*
Now! it. is perfectly clear! of course! that

these being prior to the statute, of limitations!
whatever may be the issue about the relevance of

predatory acts under anti-trust law within the
statute of limitations! it is evident that these

are not actionable*

There is a doctrine in anti-trust law that
events occurring prior to — that are in a period
barred by the statute may be used to give content

to .events occurring subsequent to the statute!

7L
1

and I would be the last to contend that for such

2

purpose things could not be so admitted-

3

we will ourselves allude to events occurring

4

prior-

Indeedn

5

Howeveri this whole series of documents appea

6

to me — and Plaintiff-, of course-, in response can

7

state what they claim for them

8

me to relate to statements of intention of the

9

companyi that is to say-, they are standard

10

11

but appear to

anti-trust evidence where intention is an issueNow-. if your Honor please-. I think that in

12

this case intentions of CEI will not be an issue-,

13

and in order that there can be no doubt about this

14

I have reduced to writing an admission concerning

15

the intentions of CEI regarding Huny Light and I

16

would like to hand it up to your Honor so there

17

can be no question about it-

18

copy to fir- Norris-

19

And I will give a

I will read this and in discussions we can

20

put any kind of gloss on this,which appears to be

21

necessary -

22
:23
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hJhat I am stating isi and thisn I confessi
is an admission:
"CEI has in the past intended! and attempted!

to reduce or eliminate competition between it

and Huny Light by one or more of the .following
means:

"!•

Acquisition by purchase

"5.

Agreement with tluny Light express or

implied to reduce or eliminate competition by

one or a combination of means - such as:

"a-

Equalization of rates to private

customers.
"b.

A mutual policy of refraining,

from soliciting or expanding to serve

the others customers - a mutual ’live
and let live* situation.

"3.

tdhen competition could not be peacefully

reduced or eliminated! CEI competed as vigorously
as it could in the area in which there is .
duplication of service with Huny Light and still
intends to do so-

In furtherance of this effort

CEI sometimes sought to avoid doing land in any

event did not wish to doJ things which would help
Huny Light to compete more effectively.

7&
Noui if your Honor pleassi this is a

perfectly cleari I thinki admission.

If this

be a violation of antitrust law so far as intent
to monopolize is. concernedi theni of coursei your

Honor must rule on the basis of this admission.

Ide would contest that viewn of course.

Nowt if your Honor pleasei we submit that
all of this mass of evidence devoted to proving

that CEI intended to reduce or eliminate Huny

Light or competition between it and Huny Light

has-i in view of this submission-i I submiti no
relevance in this case because the intent is

admitted andi secondly! the items are not
actionable.
Now-i if acts occurring! in view of this '

intent! subsequent to the statute of limitations
period involved violations of antitrust laws -which! of course! is the issue yet remaining

before us and which I do not propose to argue at
this moment — if these constitute violations of
the antitrust laws! either because they were

predatory or for some other reason! then this is
the issue we can try out ahead of us.

But for

the plaintiff to introduce the hundreds of

exhibits and thousands of pages of documents

75
which can have no other purposei legal purposen

then to show the intent with which we actedi I

submit we can eliminate a whole class of exhibitsNow I want to add one more general item to
this because it relates to this-i also-

Ide know from what I think of as the

argumentative exhibits-i that is to sayn the

exhibits-that the plaintiff has clearly designed
to accompany testimony of experts and the liken
we know from looking at these exhibitsn we know
as well from the proposed stipulations -- and many

of the stipulations we have agreed to — that a

substantial part of plaintiff’s case relates to
claiming that various activities of the company or

the company’s representatives! whichn for want of
a better word-i I will classify as lobbying-i

constituted various attempts to frustrate fluny
Light or to interfere with its business.
Now-, there is no question but that

representatives of the company made approaches
to and arguments to the Council of the City of

Cleveland! for example! and I want to use that
not to indicate that that’s exclusive but to
illustrate my argumentThere is no question we
•.
’ •••
>
did this.
I think it is equally clear! if your

Honor pleassn that such activity is protected
under the First Amendment.

Now-, such things are sometimes admitted in

evidence again to show the intent with which other
acts are done-, and again those acts are not

actionable whether they occurred before or after
the statute of limitations period but-, in any
event-, they are only admissible-, if at all-, and

then not admissible if they exhibit prejudice-,
they are admissible only for the purpose of

showing the character of activities which are

actionable.

And-, if your Honor please-, the only

cha'racterization of later acts which is offered
by these earlier acts-, whether they are lobbying

efforts or-whether they are the pre-statute of

limitation efforts-, go to the intent of the
company.
Now-, -for example-, fir. Rudolph in a case

down at the Public Utilities Commission — which

the record will show-, if we get to it-, the City
used extensively to attempt to — I hesitate to
use the term — exert discovery for the purpose

of this case — the following testimony was given

by Fir.-Rudolph-, and-this-. I presume, will be in
the case.

